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Trends
Relating a stimulus to the self (self-
reference) enhances perception and
memory.
After relating a stimulus to the self,
associating the stimulus to another
person is difﬁcult.
Self-reference leads to coupling across
different stages of processing.
Self-reference leads to increased func-
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We propose a new account of how self-reference affects information process-
ing. We report evidence that self-reference affects the binding of memory to
source, the integration of parts into perceptual wholes, and the ability to switch
from a prior association to new associations. Self-reference also inﬂuences the
integration of different stages of processing, linking attention to decision mak-
ing, and affects the coupling between brain regions mediating self-representa-
tion and attention to the environment. Taken together, the data suggest that self-
reference acts as a form of ‘integrative glue’which can either enhance or disrupt
performance, depending on the task context. We discuss the implications for
understanding the self, and future directions for research.tional coupling between brain regions.
Effects of self-reference are proposed
to reﬂect increased binding between
stimuli, between different stages of
processing, and between brain areas.
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What does having a self-representation do for us? Freud (1949) famously distinguished between
the id, the ego, and the super-ego, arguing that self-representation through the ego mediates
between basic instinctive drives (the id) and societal demands (the super-ego) [1]. The self acts
to maintain a homeostasis between our drives and our social context. Other theoreticians,
however, have argued that the self does not do anything for us because there is no single,
integrated self-representation. For example, William James (1890) distinguished between a
physical, a mental, and a spiritual self, each of which had its own attributes [2]. Others argue that
the self is a convenient ﬁction, somewhat similar to the concept of a center of gravity, in that it
serves as an explanatory narrative without serving as a processing mechanism that generates
such a narrative [3,4]. We argue here that the presence of a self-representation does indeed do
something for us – notably it acts as an integrative hub for information processing, helping to
bind together different types of information and even different stages of processing. Our
argument for ‘the integrative self’ is based on ﬁve pieces of evidence, each of which occurs
when people make reference to the self within the task they are performing. We show that self-
reference (i) helps to bind memories to their source, (ii) increases perceptual integration, (iii)
makes it difﬁcult to re-bind a new association to a stimulus formerly linked to the self, (iv)
modulates the coupling between attention and decision-making, and (v) increases interactions
between brain regions. Self-reference provides a form of associative ‘glue’ for perception,
memory, and decision making and, through this, acts as a central mechanism in information
processing. A framework for these ideas is presented in Figure 1.
Self-Reference and Binding in Memory
There is now a great deal of evidence indicating that memory is enhanced when people
categorize stimuli in relation to themselves rather than others [5–13]. For example, a recent
study [14] asked participants to make judgments about either the self-relevance of positive and
negative adjectives, or about the semantic meaning of the items. There was better recollectionTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2015.08.015 1
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Glossary
Independent race model: a formal
model of performance if there is
independent processing of two
targets. This model is violated if
performance with redundant targets
is even more efﬁcient than can be
predicted from the model.
Left posterior superior temporal
sulcus (LpSTS): the posterior
portion of the superior temporal
sulcus in the left hemisphere, which
we link to stimulus-driven attention to
a stimulus
N2 and P3: electroencephalography
(EEG) components evoked about
200 ms and 400–500 ms after the
presentation of a stimulus, typically
thought to reﬂect attentional
engagement and decision making
respectively.
Redundancy gain: the gain in
performance when participants are
presented with two exemplars of a
target compared with when they
receive a single target item.
Self-reference effect: the better
performance on stimuli that are
related to the self compared with
stimuli related to other people.
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC): a brain region strongly
associated with self-related
processing.
Sm 1
Percepon
Memory
Decision
making
Sm 2
Self-
representaon
Figure 1. A Framework for Self-Related Integrative Processing. In this framework we propose that the activation of
self-representations modulates (grey nodes) the mapping between stimuli (Stim) and perception, memory, and decision
making, and also between different stages of information processing (perception, memory, and decision making).for items judged in relation to the self compared to items whose meaning was evaluated.
Furthermore, participants recalled more episodic details about items judged in relation to
themselves compared to items judged for meaning. This held for both older participants and
participants in their late teens and twenties. This result, not only for better general recall but also
for the integration of perceptual detail in the memory, ﬁts with the idea that Self-reference
effects (see Glossary) enhance the binding together of different forms of information (here the
perceptual detail along with any verbal memory). In another study [15], researchers showed
children images of their own or another child's face together with an object, with the task being to
judge whether the child liked the object. When subsequently tested for memory, the children not
only demonstrated better performance on objects judged in relation to themselves but they also
performed better when asked to remember which face the remembered object was presented
with [15,16] (Figure 2A). There was better binding in memory of all the information initially present
– thus people were not only better able to remember which items occurred but also whether they
had judged the item in relation to themselves or other people. These studies indicate that the
result holds across a wide age-range (from children to older adults). Indeed, these effects of self-
reference on memory can even increase in older adults [17–19], perhaps because older people
become more self-focused, because they have problems in seeing other people's perspective
[20,21], or because of reduced memory and executive processes outside those based on self-
reference [22–26]. This last argument raises the possibility that effects of self-reference operate
independently of executive and elaborative encoding strategies that otherwise modulate
memory.
The above ﬁndings (notably [14]) indicate that self-referential effects cannot be reducedmerely to
effects of deeper semantic encoding. Other work indicates that self-reference improves memory
even when the effects of deep semantic coding are absent. For example, a neuropsychological
study [27] examined a patient, GA, with both a semantic impairment [28] and severe amnesia.
GA was shown objects which were assigned either to him or the experimenter. In a second
condition he made a judgment either about whether an object was living or non-living (deep
semantic classiﬁcation), or about its physical size (surface classiﬁcation). GA had enhanced
recognition and source memory for objects classiﬁed as belonging to him compared to objects
assigned to the experimenter. These effects did not differ in magnitude from those found with
age-matched controls. However, there was no effect of semantic classiﬁcation versus surface
classiﬁcation, whereas controls showed clear beneﬁts after semantic classiﬁcation (Figure 2B).2 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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Figure 2. The Self-Reference Effect in Memory. (A) Corrected proportional recognition scores of children 4, 5, and 6
years old show better recognition performance for items referenced against the self relative to other people across the three
groups. Reprinted from [15] with permission from John Wiley and Sons (©2013). (B) Results from patient GA (category-
speciﬁc impairment and amnesia) and age-matched controls on recognition and source memory tasks following judgments
about ownership by the self or another person (left), or judgments about whether stimuli were living or non-living (a semantic
classiﬁcation task) or whether the images were large or small (a surface classiﬁcation task). The control participants showed
improved recognition and source memory following both self-reference and semantic classiﬁcation (compared to when
reference was made to another person and to when judgments were made about physical size). By contrast, GA had
enhanced memory after self-reference but showed no reliable effects of semantic versus surface classiﬁcation. The data
indicate that effects of self-reference can occur independently of the effects of semantic elaboration onmemory. This affects
the binding of memories to their source (in the source memory task) [27].These data indicate that the effects of self-reference are not only stronger than the effects of
semantic classiﬁcation [29] but also that they are independent of semantic encoding effects.
Self-Reference and Binding in Perception
There is evidence that self-reference also enhances the binding of visual features in perception.
Studies of face-processing show faster classiﬁcation of self faces than the faces of other peopleTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 3
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inverted (when face features may play a strong role in classiﬁcation) and when the faces are
upright (when conﬁgural information is more salient). Interestingly, there is an advantage for
friend over stranger faces too, but only when the faces are upright [30]. This suggests that friend-
faces beneﬁt from the conﬁgural properties present in upright faces, while self faces have both
enhanced integration of features into conﬁgurations and feature processing, and thus gain both
when upright and inverted.
This qualitative difference between the processing of self and friend faces indicates that
enhanced self-face processing may not be reduced to greater effects of familiarity for self
relative to other stimuli. This argument is also supported by work using neutral shapes, which
also indicates that self-reference improves perceptual integration. Work on neutral shapes
has used a simple associative-matching procedure [32,33]. Participants associate a personal
label (e.g., stranger, friend, you) to a shape (triangle, circle, square) [33]. Next, they judge if a
shape–label pair matches (triangle–stranger, square–you) or mismatches (triangle–you, square–
stranger). Match times are substantially faster for stimuli associated with the self (square–you)
than for stimuli associated to other people (triangle–friend, circle–friend), even though the shapes
are equally familiar. In addition, the contrast of the stimuli was reduced in some experiments.
Reducing the contrast has a greater effect on stimuli associated with a friend than stimuli
associated with the self [33]. This is consistent with perception being enhanced for self-related
stimuli, such that they suffer less when their contrast is reduced.
This procedure has subsequently been used to assess more speciﬁcally whether self-reference
affects perceptual integration between stimuli. After forming associations between one personal
label and two shapes (you–circle, you–square) [34], participants were asked to identify single or
pairs of shapes as referring to the self or a friend. When the shapes referred to the self, there was
a large beneﬁt from presenting two relative to one exemplar – this is known in the literature as
a redundancy gain [35–37]. Formal mathematical modeling showed that this enhanced
redundancy gain was greater than could be expected if there were independent processing
of each of the self–shape exemplars (Figure 3). The same beneﬁt was not apparent for stimuli
associated with a friend. Previous results indicate that redundancy gains are particularly large
if the stimuli are parts of a grouped conﬁguration [38] or object [39]. These results ﬁt with a
proposal that self-related shapes are integrated into a single representation so that participants
respond to an integrated ‘self Gestalt’.
Switching from the Self
If self-reference increases binding between stimuli then, in addition to enhanced initial learning of
self-associations, we may make a second prediction – namely that it may be difﬁcult to form new
associations to stimuli formerly linked to the self. This has been shown in a study of switching
costs [40]. Following previous studies [32–34], participants ﬁrst carried out a block of perceptual
matching trials with shapes assigned to personal labels (square–you, triangle–friend, circle–
stranger) and then formed new shape–label associations (e.g., square–friend, triangle–stranger,
circle–you). The results showed faster matches to self-associated stimuli when the second
association was formed (circle–you < square–friend and triangle–stranger), consistent with the
self enhancing binding. However this came at a cost for new associations to a shape that
was formerly linked to the self (square–friend and square–stranger > triangle–stranger and
circle–friend) in errors and reaction times. Furthermore, individuals who showed a strong self-
advantage when matching shapes based on the initial associations had a greater cost when the
self-shape was reassigned to a new association. This correlation was weaker for friend-
associated stimuli [40]. The data indicate that enhanced binding between the self and a shape
made it difﬁcult to later reassociate that shape to another personal reference. There is a ‘sticky
trace’ from self-binding.4 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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Figure 3. Mathematical Modeling of Redundancy Gains. (Top) When participants are required to identify whether a
square or a circle is present, reaction times are faster on redundant (two item) than single-item trials [34]. (Bottom) Formal
tests of redundancy gains for self- (right) and friend-associated (left) stimuli by assessing if there is violation of independent
processing of the redundant stimuli. The graphs show the cumulative probability of a response being made as a function of
reaction time (the probability of responding increases as reaction times become slower). We show the results for redundant
self-stimuli and the results predicted by adding together the probability of responding when single stimuli are shown. This is
the maximum performance (the boundary performance) that can be predicted if there is independent processing of the
elements in a redundant stimulus. Note that the graph for redundant self-stimuli falls to the left of the boundary for
processing the elements independently. This provides strong evidence for the self stimuli being integrated such that
participants respond to a representation in which the elements are integrated into a whole, rather than being coded
independently of each other. Copyright ©2015 American Psychological Association. Adapted from [34]. The use of APA
information does not imply endorsement by APA.Self-Reference Binds Stages of Processing
We have presented evidence that self-reference affects binding between stimuli in memory and
in perception, and that it leaves a ‘trace’ that can disrupt the binding of new information with a
self-related stimulus. Alongside evidence on stimulus binding, there are data indicating that self-
reference helps to integrate different stages of processing. Consider the ﬁndings reported in a
study using event-related potentials (ERPs) [41] to examine the effects of facial cues on the
orienting of visual attention. On each trial there was a central face which turned either to the left or
right. This was followed by a visual target, randomly left or right of center, to which participants
made a discrimination response. Turning the head towards the target facilitated responses,
especially when the face was that of the participant. This beneﬁt from turning the head to the
target modulated two components of the event-related potentials recorded using electroen-
cephalography (EEG). There was both an enhanced N1 component to self-related faces and a
reduced P3 component. An enhanced N1 component has been linked to greater attentional
responding to a stimulus [42,43], while reductions in the P3 component are associated with
greater certainty in decision making [44]. Notably there was a correlation between the self-bias
effects for the two components – individuals who had a larger effect of the self on attention (the
N1 effect) also had a stronger effect of the self on decision making (P3). This suggests thatTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 5
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decision making (indexed by the P3 effect). Consistent with the argument for increased effects of
cueing owing to increased attention to the self cue (the turning face), other studies have shown
that images of the self as a central distractor disproportionately hurt performance on overlaid
targets, suggesting that self-faces attract more attentional resources, thus reducing perfor-
mance on other targets [45]. This increased attention may then enhance binding between
different stages of processing.
Self-Reference Enhances the Coupling Between Brain Regions
There is also neural evidence indicating self-reference affects the coupling between different
stages of processing – in this case, the retrieval of a self-representation and the allocation of
attention to the environment. fMRI studies havemeasured brain activity while participants carried
out the associative matching task with shapes linked to personally relevant labels [46]. Two areas
have been shown to be reliably more active when self-related stimuli are presented compared
with when participants see stimuli associated with other people: the ventromedial prefrontal
cortex (vmPFC) and the left posterior superior temporal sulcus (LpSTS) (Figure 4). Across
many studies the vmPFC has been implicated in self-representation and is activated when
participants refer stimuli to themselves relative to other people [47–59]. The LpSTS can be
considered part of a ventral attention system concerned with orienting attention to the envi-
ronment [60]. Mathematical modeling of the fMRI data, using dynamic causal modeling [61],
revealed a best-ﬁtting model in which the vmPFC and LpSTS had excitatory connections, and
the presence of self-related stimuli increased the functional connectivity between the vmPFC
and the LpSTS. The strength of these connections also predicted behavioral responses to self-
related stimuli (Figure 4). From this evidence we conclude that self-reference enhances the
neural coupling between regions concerned with a core self-representation (vmPFC) and with
distinct domain-speciﬁc regions associated with different components of the self, including self-
related attention (LpSTS).
Indeed, a meta-analysis has demonstrated that there is enhanced neural coupling for self-
processing (vs other-related processing) between the vmPFC/pregenual anterior cingulate
(pACC) and several other regions including the bilateral anterior insula, left striatum, right
thalamus, and amygdala [62]. These results match the resting-state functional connectivity
when the pACC is treated as a seed [62]. Similarly, clinical work has shown changes of neural
coupling between the medial PFC and other brain regions when patients process self-related
information [63,64]. For example, researchers reported that altered self-awareness in Alz-
heimer's disease patients is associated with changes in functional connectivity between the
medial PFC and other cortical midline structures and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [63]. This last
result indicates that the changes in functional brain connectivity related to the self may play a
causal role in self-awareness.
Is the Self Special?
Our arguments have stressed the role of self-reference in binding. There is a major question of
whether self-reference is special in this respect or whether the effects stem from another
underlying factor such as the familiarity of the stimulus, its inherent reward value [65], or its
emotional valence [66]. Although we do think that a deﬁnitive answer cannot be given currently,
there is suggestive evidence that the effects of self-reference may not be completely reduced to
these factors. For example, self-reference effects have frequently been contrasted against
effects of reference to a close other, including the participant's mother [33], and the effects
of self-reference are typically dominant. In addition, in procedures such as associative learning
with neutral shapes, familiarity effects can be eliminated when participants respond only to the
shapes, but self-bias effects remain [34,67]. Biases are also not found when associations are
made to neutral objects varying in familiarity [68].6 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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Figure 4. Self-Reference Enhances
the Coupling of Activity Across Brain
Regions. (A) Brain regions where activity
for self-related stimuli is greater than
activity for stimuli related to other people.
Ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) is
shown on the upper right and left poster-
ior superior temporal sulcus (LpSTS) is
shown on the upper left. (B) Blood oxygen
level dependent (BOLD) activation to self,
friend and stranger stimuli in vmPFC and
LpSTS. (C) The best-ﬁtting model show-
ing excitatory functional connectivity
between the LpSTS and the vmPFC. *
P < 0.05; ** P < 0.01. The strength of
the connection from vmPFC to LpSTS
correlated with reaction times to self-
related stimuli [46].In addition, studies of perceptual integration have examined associations to reward as well as to
the self [34]. The striking redundancy gains to self-related stimuli (Figure 2) are reduced for
reward-related items, suggesting that reward has weaker effects on perceptual integration. By
contrast, the relations between the self and reward may depend on the individual. Researchers
pitted the effects of reward against the self by giving a higher reward value to stimuli associated
with other people compared with stimuli associated with the self [69]. Participants with a strong
self-bias were minimally inﬂuenced by the differential reward values, but participants with weak
self-bias were affected. It may be that there are individual differences in how much the
heightened effects of self-reference are dependent on associated underlying factors such as
reward, with this being the case in some individuals but not in others with a strong, autonomous
self-representation.
Theoretical Implications
If our argument about self-reference affecting binding is correct, then several theoretical
implications follow. One relates to the longstanding controversy on whether there is a common
self-representation or a number of distinct self-representations [1,2]. Our suggestion is that there
are pervasive effects on binding within and across different levels of processing. This enhancedTrends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy 7
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enabling a core self-representation to be formed. This core self-representation should be
accessed across different tasks and levels of processing, even if there are other distinct aspects
of the self tapped by different tasks (e.g., a body-based representation which may be repre-
sented in different neural areas to a more conceptual representation of the self). Consistent with
this, a recent meta-analysis of brain imaging data has indicated a set of common brain regions
that are sensitive to the self/other distinction across tasks as divergent as face recognition and
trait judgments (including cortical midline structures and the insula [48–51]), while other brain
regions show task-speciﬁc responses that are enhanced to the self (e.g., in occipital regions in
face-recognition tasks). The cortical midline structures have also been shown to be more
strongly activated by self-related stimuli than by stimuli related to other people in tasks ranging
from visual self-recognition [54–57], autobiographical memory [10,58], and self-evaluation [59].
We suggest that this reﬂects the activation of a core self-representation. Whether binding
processes vary for the core self-representation and for any of the more distinct aspects of
the self is unknown, although we discuss issues related to the mechanisms of binding below.
A second implication relates to the philosophical argument about whether the self serves as a
processing mechanism or whether it merely stems from a narrative that reﬂects, but does not
modulate, ongoing processes ([3,4], but see [70,71]). The evidence we have summarized here
indicates that self-reference alters ongoing processes by enhancing binding. This in turn
suggests that self-reference operates as a mechanism that changes ongoing processing,
and is not merely a narrative-based reﬂection on the processing that may have taken place.
A third implication relates to the idea of ‘self-expansion’ in social psychology. Researchers have
put forward this idea to explain the tendency for people to expand the representation of
themselves, such that the in-groups that they are members of become incorporated into the
self [68]. Some researchers [72,73] argue that there is a basic motivation to expand the self so
that more attributes are available to help an individual attain a goal. The binding effects we have
summarized can provide a mechanism for self-expansion because stimuli (and perhaps more
abstract concepts such as our ‘in-group’) can be linked more rapidly to the self than to other
people. There is an asymmetric expansion of our self-representation compared to the repre-
sentations of others, ﬁtting the self-expansion model.
Individual Differences, Psychopathology, and Fast Access to the Self
There remain many questions. One concerns the neural mechanisms that underlie the increased
binding brought about through self-reference, which are currently unclear. There are also
individual differences in the magnitude of self-bias effects which are stable within participants
[74]. The factors that lead to such differences are not understood, nor is it clear whether
differences found within the normal population can be linked to differences in self-representation
and binding in psychological disorders such as schizophrenia and depression. The approach we
are advocating, however, does allow bridges to be built between the underlying neural sub-
strates, individual differences, and psychopathology. For example, one possibility is that con-
trasting levels of global, excitatory neurotransmitters (e.g., glutamate [75]) are recruited through
self-reference, and that this leads to the ubiquitous increases in binding; this idea is captured in
the Outstanding Questions. It would then follow that individual differences in the normal
population and in cases of psychological disorder might reﬂect contrasting strengths of binding,
moderated by variations in neurotransmitters (see Outstanding Questions).
Within the framework in Figure 1, there would need to be rapid access to self-representations to
generate an effect on ongoing processes. There is some supportive evidence for this. Notably,
self-reference effects are associated with activation of the anterior N2 EEG component over
central frontal regions [76]. We propose that rapid activation of self-representations in these brain8 Trends in Cognitive Sciences, Month Year, Vol. xx, No. yy
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Outstanding Questions
Are the processes that bind stimuli in
perception the same as those that bind
stimuli in memory? Is there a single
form of binding induced by self-
reference?
How is integration achieved across dif-
ferent stages of binding? Are themech-
anisms involved in self-related binding
across different stages of processing
the same as those involved in binding
within a processing stage?
What are the neural mechanisms of
self-related binding – are particular
neurotransmitter systems involved?
What are the exact relations between
self-related biases and basic motiva-
tional drivers such as reward and
emotion?regions then feeds back to modulate processing in perception, memory, and decision making.
Analogous arguments to this have been made in relation to object recognition, suggesting that
rapid access to object representations in orbitofrontal cortex helps to ‘tune’ visual processing to
initial perceptual ‘hypotheses’ [77]. We suggest that there is a similar rapid process of tuning to
self-representations.
Concluding Remarks
We conclude that self-reference enhances the binding of information in perception and memory,
and that this can help to explain the pervasive inﬂuence of self-reference on information
processing. Learning more about the neural basis of these effects will be crucial for further
understanding of what the self does for us.
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